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
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
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
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STUDENT REPORT

MAXIMIZING THE BENEFIT OF THE
SYSTEMIC INSPECTION PROCESS

MAJOR BRISTOL W. WILLIAMS, JR. 85-2860
"insights into tomorrow"

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REPORT NUMBER 85-2860

TITLE MAXIMIZING THE BENEFIT OF THE SYSTEMIC INSPECTION PROCESS

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

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PREFACE

I have written this paper to stimulate thought on the evolving inspection process used by the Army Inspector General system. It addresses the apparent contradiction between the overall mission goals of the Inspector General and the inspection system, which is a single facet of his responsibility. It is essential that the inspection process continue to reflect an interest in the well-being of the soldier. Historically, the Inspector General has concerned himself with the soldier, and this has been the real value of the IG system. An assignment as an Assistant Inspector General in charge of the installation inspection team sparked my interest in the subject.

I gratefully acknowledge several people who provided invaluable assistance in the study. These individuals include my sponsor, Lt Col Eugene O. Neville, for his guidance and sage advice in moving me along the right path; my advisor, Major Larry A. Turner, for his overall assistance and, especially, for his willingness to accept a project from a sister service; and, my wife, Kathleen, for editing and typing. Finally, I could not have completed the study without the candid and helpful comments from numerous officers serving as inspectors general throughout Forces Command. "First be right; then take action."

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Williams graduated from the United States Military Academy in June 1970, receiving a commission in the field artillery. After attending Airborne and Ranger Schools, Major Williams assumed his initial duties with the 1st Battalion, 94th Artillery in Furth, Federal Republic of Germany. In 1974, following three years in Germany, he transferred to Fort Hood, Texas. There Major Williams served as a battery commander and assistant operations officer with the 1st Battalion, 14th Field Artillery, part of "Patton's Own" 2d Armored Division. Following graduation from the Field Artillery Officer Advance Course in 1977, he was assigned to 210th Field Artillery Brigade in Herzogenaurach, F.R.G. During this tour, Major Williams was a battery commander of a Lance missile battery and a brigade plans and operations officer. Upon return to CONUS, Major Williams was assigned to Fort Stewart, Georgia, where he worked as a battalion operations officer and an assistant inspector general. Major Williams has earned a Master of Arts Degree from Central Michigan University in Business Management. His military schooling includes Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advance Courses, Lance Officer Course, and Department of the Army IG Orientation Course.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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REPORT NUMBER 85-2860

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR BRISTOL W. WILLIAMS, JR., USA

TITLE MAXIMIZING THE BENEFIT OF THE SYSTEMIC INSPECTION PROCESS

I. Purpose: To demonstrate that a more comprehensive model for Inspector General inspections should be developed to insure incorporation of lower level inspectors general.

II. Problem: Although the current Army guidance published in AR 20-1 specifies a general inspection model for use throughout the IG system, the guidance has little application at the division level. The guidance does not suggest a logical technique for including the company and battalion functions in the IG inspection. Because the Army guidance de-emphasizes the soldier issues found in the companies, the Army-wide inspection process is not optimized.

III. Data: During the 1970s, Congress perceived that the executive agencies of the government operated inefficiently. As a result, Congress created offices of inspector general in most departments of the executive branch. Although they made no effort to change the function of the military inspector general, the emphasis on fraud, waste, and abuse placed pressures on the military IG. The Army Inspector General responded by redesigning the methods used to conduct the inspection process. This new design became known as the systemic inspection approach and was differentiated from the traditional method called the compliance approach. Although

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this technique was widely taught by the Department of the Army Inspector General and was included in literature published by the Inspector General, it did not gain acceptance by the lower levels of the Army. The division installations continued to use the traditional compliance techniques to conduct inspections. These division inspections focused principally on the function of the companies and battalions.

IV. Conclusions: The systemic inspection approach does not attain all of the management benefits possible. Because the company and battalion are so critical to the diagnosis of problems, a thorough inspection approach must include an evaluation of the lowest level in the Army. It is possible to fulfill the potential of the systemic approach by requiring a compliance inspection at company and battalion to develop issues as the first step of a total systemic methodology.

V. Recommendations: The Department of the Army Inspector General should change the guidance in Army Regulation 20-1 (Inspector General Activities and Procedures) to reflect a mandatory compliance inspection of companies and battalions. This guidance should specify those areas deemed essential to the efficient function of the Army and should be standardized.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

"The IG. . . helps a unit tighten things up and look more critically at the way it's doing business. He can identify problem areas and provide solutions. It's a fair system with immediate response that reaches all of the Army" (5:30). This quotation from a company commander reflects the prevalent view of battalion and company commanders concerning the inspection function of the Inspector General. Although an inspection can often be a demanding and humbling experience, the commander needs and wants an opportunity to have outside eyes evaluate his organization. Until recently, the Inspector General system has provided this evaluation for company and battalion commanders.

The new inspection methodology, espoused by the Department of the Army Inspector General and promulgated in Army Regulation 20-1, has a far different approach to the inspection process. Under the newly developed compliance/systemic technique, the company and battalion are relegated to secondary importance. Their organization, so basic to the efficiency of the Army, is now viewed as a hunting ground for systemic problems whose solution will have significance for the whole Army. This study questions the process that created a new emphasis in the Inspector General inspection and asks how the company and battalion can be brought back to the forefront in the inspection methodology.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Department of the Army guidance published in AR 20-1 specifies a general inspection model for use by all Army inspectors general. This model has proven to be applicable at major commands (MACOM). The guidance, however, does not specify an application for the company and battalion. This failure limits the Army-wide inspection process.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The main objective of this paper is to demonstrate that a more comprehensive model for Inspector General inspections should be developed to insure complete coverage of Army issues. In order to accomplish this objective, the paper will address several points. The first point demonstrates that the evolution to the current inspection process was influenced by external forces, which have defined the nature of the inspection process in the Armed Forces. Additionally, the paper will

compare the general inspection model found in Department of the Army publications with the methodology employed by lower level inspectors general, specifically at the divisional installation. Finally, the paper will develop an alternative model for the inspection process.

LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Although the study has general application, the author gathered data from units assigned to Forces Command (FORSCOM) only. Since the bulk of the divisional units are assigned to FORSCOM, a study of those units should have general application to other MACOM. Likewise, the study does not address the inspection of Reserve or National Guard units. In addition to these limitations, the following assumptions are necessary to provide significance to the study:

1. A more effective IG inspection process is in the best interest of the U.S. Army.
2. Efficiency of design in the inspection methodology outweighs political consideration.
3. The basic organization of the U.S. Army and the relative effect of the company and battalion on its efficiency will not change in the short run. (Reorganization under DIV 86 and similar initiatives alters the make-up of the company and battalion but leaves the command structure untouched.)

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This paper will first demonstrate that the Army Inspector General inspection process has changed during the last ten years to reflect a trend developed by Congressional action. This newly specified method of inspecting will be developed in detail from appropriate publications. Although this new method of inspecting is institutionalized through the publication of regulations and training at the IG course, the units below MACOM have not adopted it. The paper will develop a compilation of the inspection methods used at division levels for the inspection of company and battalion. The paper will then compare the published inspection model against the techniques compiled from several divisional installations. From this comparison, the paper will suggest numerous problem areas that exist in the current inspection model. Finally, the study will propose a more comprehensive, inclusive model for conducting IG inspections throughout the Army.

Chapter Two

THE TRADITIONAL IG

The U.S. Army Inspector General system traces its origins to the Continental Army of the Revolutionary War. Acting on reports of graft, corruption, and inefficiency in the Army, the Continental Congress created a position of Inspector General modeled on similar positions in European armies of the time (4:11-15). Congress's original concept involved an inspector who reported directly to that legislative body. George Washington, however, adamantly insisted that the position of Inspector General be subordinate either to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army or to the commander of the detachment in which the inspector was assigned (2:443). Washington envisioned a position whose duties involved the inspection of "the number and condition of the men, their discipline and exercise, as the state of their arms, accoutrements and cloathes [sic]. . . ." (3:4). Reports of ". . . deficiencies and neglects. . ." (3:444) went directly to the commander of the organization or detachment to which the inspector general was assigned.

This philosophy has essentially remained intact through the years. The two principal tenets espoused by Washington and supported by Baron von Steuben, the first effective Continental Inspector General, are still viable today. These principles are: (1) the Inspector General works for a commander; and, (2) the Inspector General is responsible for assessing conditions that affect the soldiers of the command.

Congress codified this philosophy in the Army Reorganization Act of 1950. In this law, Congress directed the Inspector General to inquire ". . . the discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army. . . ." (4:1). Although Washington's directions to the first Inspector General were more specific, clearly a thread of continuity existed between the law and the resolution of the Continental Congress. Both law and resolution recognized the discipline of the soldier as a key reason for the inspection. In addition, the Continental concern with the "state of their arms, accoutrements and cloathes" changed, as the Army became more complex, to a concern for efficiency and economy.

These guiding concepts of efficiency, economy, and discipline have defined the nature of the Inspector General's inspection. Although each command has developed an inspection that reflected the emphasis of the current commander, the nature and tone of the inspection remained similar. The Inspector General looked at ". . . compliance with formal guidance" (10:99). Under this concept, the Inspector General compared the performance of the unit against a published standard found in the plan

regulations, and policies of the command. Typically, the inspector viewed an inspected unit as a separate organization with no ties to a higher level. As a result, the inspector held the inspected unit responsible for all deficiencies noted. Since all functional areas were looked at in depth, the inspector provided detailed feedback on the areas requiring remedial action.

A CHANGING ROLE FOR THE IG

Just as the Congress of 1777 had been the catalyst that began the inspector general program, the Congress of 1978 provided the impetus for a subtle shift in emphasis. Congress passed in that year the Inspector General Act of 1978. This law grew from a Congressional concern that investigative agencies in the executive branch were neither coordinated nor effective. Since these perceived abuses could result in the loss of substantial funds, Congress directed that each executive agency in the government establish a position of inspector general. This post would be the focal point for eliminating these failures in economy and efficiency (1:101-103). Agency inspectors general were designed to be free from political ties, although they are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The agency inspector general can be removed from his position only by the President, who is then required to explain to Congress his reasons for the removal (16:92 STAT. 1102).

Although the Inspector General Act of 1978 specifically omitted the Department of Defense in its reorganization, it directed the Secretary of Defense to review the procedures in use to monitor the effectiveness of his department. Congress, also, directed the Secretary to establish a task force whose mission was the study of investigative components within the Department of Defense (8:23). This task force recommended the establishment of an Under Secretary of Defense for Review and Oversight, a position that would not enjoy the freedom of action of the other agency inspectors general. In making its recommendations, however, the task force was careful to assert that the function of the military inspector general was different than that established in the executive departments and agencies (4:96).

The recommendations of the Department of Defense task force, however, did not assuage the concerns of Congress. With the passage of the Defense Authorization Act in 1983, Congress established a Department of Defense Inspector General. This individual was granted the same degree of independence established under the Inspector General Act of 1978, except that certain matters involving national security could be exempted from inspection by the Secretary of Defense. The position of military inspector general was not changed; however, their reports and activities became subject to review by the higher level agency within the Department of Defense (17:96 STAT. 751-753).

A review of the two laws that resulted in the establishment of inspectors general in the executive branch points to an increased concern by Congress regarding the function of Department of Defense Inspectors

General. Although the military inspectors general were not touched directly by the legislation, the implication was clear that Congress was interested. In addition, a new agency now existed above the military inspector general which was empowered to make standardization or efficiency changes in the traditional roles enjoyed by the military.

A second implication for the military inspector general was the change in emphasis. Whereas the inspector general traditionally dealt with matters of discipline, economy, and efficiency, the new operative words provided by Congress were fraud, waste, and abuse.

THE ARMY IG INSPECTION CHANGES

As Congress became more interested in the investigative agencies at work in the executive branch, it was inevitable that the military inspectors general receive more scrutiny. For the Army, the direct influence of Congress in the investigative function came in 1977 with a report to Congress from the General Accounting Office (GAO). This report dealt with the relationship between the Army Audit Agency (AAA) and the Department of the Army Inspector General. The structure at that time subordinated AAA to the Inspector General. The GAO report to Congress recommended a reorganization that placed the AAA directly subordinate to the Secretary of the Army (14:iii).

Although this recommendation did not directly address the conduct of IG inspections in the Army, some analysis contained in the report had important implications for Army inspections. GAO observed that inspections differed significantly from audits in the depth of coverage. The report stated that inspections were superficial in coverage and often failed to isolate the underlying cause for a condition that was reported. In addition, the short time allocated to an inspection resulted in a failure to measure the extent to which a problem existed in the organization. GAO remarks implied that the IG inspection was useful only to the extent that it surfaced problems for further investigation (14:13).

Congressional interest in the military inspector general continued during 1978, concurrent with the passage of the Inspector General Act. Although the legislation dealt with civilian inspectors general, the House Committee on Government Operations commissioned the GAO to study the military inspector general in all services to assess "... organization, role, staffing, independence, quality of work and effectiveness. . ." (13:21) In response, GAO conducted detailed examinations of each IG function in each service and recommended several fundamental changes in their operation.

The impact of this Congressional attention to the inspector general function was a reassessment of the Army's method of inspecting. In an article for Army in 1979, the Inspector General of the Army outlined a new system that departed from the traditional compliance method and embraced the systemic approach to inspection. The Army IG noted that the new approach addressed causes and not symptoms. It sought to inspect so that all appropriate agencies were considered (10:99-101). By "... incor-

porating unit problems into Army problems rather than isolating them. . ." (10:100), the focus shifted from the soldier to a system. The traditional role that concerned itself with discipline, economy, and efficiency gave way to an approach oriented on fraud, waste, and abuse. The new methodology became known as the compliance and systemic inspection method.

SUMMARY

George Washington outlined the duties of the Inspector General during the Revolutionary War by establishing a position that, although subordinate to the commander, oriented on the condition of the soldier. This role evolved an inspection method that focused on the soldier and his immediate environment. During the middle 1970s, however, Congressional concern over wasted budget funds forced a change in philosophies which was reflected by the creation of the civilian agency IG. Although this IG did not have identical functions as the military IG, the distinction in roles became blurred. The Army, reacting to Congressional influence, changed to an inspection geared toward discovery of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Chapter Three

THE INSPECTION PROCESS

Although the evolution of the Army inspection process began in the mid-1970s, the system was not defined in regulation until 1984. The publication of Army Regulation 20-1 in May 1984 provided the regulatory basis for an inspection methodology that had been discussed and taught years earlier in the U.S. Army IG Orientation Course (18:2). This chapter will discuss the current Department of the Army IG inspection process and compare the system specified in the regulation with the methods currently used at divisional installations.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY IG INSPECTION SYSTEM

The Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) advocates an inspection methodology that is called the compliance and systemic or, more commonly, the systemic inspection approach. The inspection recognizes that problems exist in the Army due to a string of interconnected organizational failures. Thus, an inspection, when it uncovers a failure to comply with regulations, directives, or plans, merely addresses a symptom of a larger systemic failure in Army agencies and not solely the unit inspected. This philosophy, thus, would dictate that a solution to the problem must begin by a thorough evaluation of the situation to determine a root cause to which remedial action may be applied. "Failure to understand this. . . may lead to the conclusion that only the activity being inspected is at fault, whereas the real problem may be with existing policy promulgated at any level" (15:3-1). The key to this approach, then, is the definition of the system.

For the purposes of the inspection method, Lieutenant General Trefry, a former Inspector General of the Army, considered a system to be defined by its objectives, environment, resources, components, and management (18:2). The complexity of the Army organization, however, required a more complete inspection approach than a simple analysis of these system elements. A system, by implication, cuts across numerous levels in the Army organization. At each level the components of the system may change to fulfill requirements or to facilitate an interface between levels. The number of possible systems in use at a given time is tremendous. As a result, an inspection approach that oriented directly on each system by evaluating the objectives, environment, resources, components, and management was impractical. The inspection approach needed a bridge that spanned the gap between the staggering number of systems in the Army and the practical daily workings.

The Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army provides this bridge (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army (FLCM)

This model illustrates that all systems within the Army support one of eight functions. These functions are force development, acquisition, training, distribution, deployment, sustainment, development, and separation (9:133). Their impact on each level within the Army varies. The systems interrelate each function and tie the functions together between levels. Categorization of inspectable areas in terms of the Army functions makes the systemic approach more manageable. An inspection can provide more articulation of an issue by analyzing a function through its processes, procedures, organizations, and players at each level (18:16).

This method certainly provides a philosophical framework within which an inspection may be conducted. The philosophy, however, does not dictate an immediate and specific technique to be used by the inspector. To more fully define the specifics of the systemic approach, this paper will reduce the methodology to its key dimensions through a comparison with the traditional compliance method.

KEY DIMENSIONS OF THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH

Although review of the literature published about the Army systemic approach might result in a variety of descriptive elements, a distillation of the information produces seven distinctive dimensions of the systemic approach. These dimensions are clearly differentiated from the compliance technique. The seven dimensions are as follows:

1. Issue orientation. The compliance inspection evaluates achievement of standards by the inspected activity against published criteria of policy and rules. A compliance inspection is general in nature with little focus provided within a selected functional area. A systemic inspection, however, is oriented to a specific issue within a functional area and often attempts to more fully develop a problem that has been isolated previously. For example, a compliance inspection might inspect the personnel management system of a battalion; while, a systemic approach would seek to determine why there are insufficient soldiers to man tank crews in the battalion.

2. Inspection team size. Because a compliance-type inspection covers many areas in the activity, the team size is large to provide a thorough comparison between the activity and the regulatory standards. When the inspection is issues oriented, as in the systemic inspection, only sufficient personnel are required to provide coverage of a prioritized issue list.

3. Search for the root cause. The goal of the compliance inspection is a list of deficiencies enumerating the failures of the activity to adhere to regulations. Often the inspection is concluded by providing the list of failures to the activity. The systemic inspection seeks "the cause of the problem" (15:3-1). Often the cause requires detailed research in organizations that provide support to the activity actually inspected.

4. Feedback to the inspected activity. The feedback to a unit from a compliance inspection is a list of deficiencies. The inspector makes

little effort to ascribe responsibility to an agency external to the inspected unit. In the case of a systemic inspection, the inspected unit may be unaware that a deficiency has been found. The inspector attempts to locate the level creating the deficiency and provides only applicable information to the inspected unit.

5. Capability orientation. "Compliance inspections concentrate on the status of a system; systemic inspections concentrate on the capability of the system" (15:3-1). This is a natural outgrowth of the divergent philosophies. The compliance inspection compares and reports conditions as they exist. The systemic inspection is more interested in the potential of the procedure, organization, or technique to achieve its intended functions. For example, a compliance inspection may report on the current operational status of vehicles in the unit; whereas, the systemic inspection is more interested in the organization's ability to repair equipment based on the functional adequacy of its troubleshooting, repair parts, and administration.

6. Frequency of inspection. Because a compliance inspection assesses status, it tends to be scheduled on a recurring basis, such as an annual inspection. A systemic inspection revolves less around a time schedule since it is programmed based on long range analysis and the discovery of appropriate prioritized problems, leads, or issues. The frequency of the inspection is dictated by the priority of the problem noted.

7. Use of the Functional Life Cycle Approach. The Functional Life Cycle Approach was designed to complement the systemic inspection methodology by providing a model that showed the logical connection of systems within the Army. A compliance inspection may take numerous forms, but normally is guided by a checklist of areas. Each area constitutes a separate inspection with little or no effort to tie together findings between areas. In addition, the inspector does not address the relationships of findings to other levels, whether higher or lower.

Although for purposes of illustration the differences between compliance and systemic inspections are accentuated, this analysis of the dimensions in the systemic inspection process provides a detailed, operative definition. For MACOMs such as Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and at Department of the Army, the applications are apparent. Also, Technical Bulletin Inspector General-1 provides a good description of the techniques used to insure that a systemic methodology is followed. Appendix A is a summary of the systemic methodology as used at MACOM and DA levels. The literature and the regulations, however, break down when the inspection is to be conducted at a lower level, such as the divisional installation. AR 20-1 states that "Commanders will determine frequency and objectives of inspections within their command" (15:3-4). It further assigns responsibility for inspections to field commanders who are authorized detailed inspectors general (15:3-5). Although some additional guidance is written on inspections, nothing can be found on the methodology. The divisional installation inspectors general are left to determine applications on their own.

HOW THE DIVISIONAL INSTALLATIONS INSPECT

Although AR 20-1 states that "IGs are trained and encouraged. . ." (15:3-1) to use the systemic methodology, the actual application techniques, as noted above, are not established. Research reveals that a different inspection technique is used at every divisional installation in FORSCOM. In addition, the overwhelming majority of the inspections can be characterized as compliance rather than systemic, which is encouraged by the regulations.

In order to assess the inspection techniques of divisional installations in FORSCOM, the author conducted telephonic interviews with the officer responsible for conducting the inspection. Each officer responded to questions designed to produce information concerning the nature of his divisional inspection. The questions asked were specifically formulated to determine how a particular divisional inspection could be evaluated in terms of the dimensions addressed above. In addition, each office was asked to provide any written material habitually used by the division to describe its inspection. A listing of this material is available in the bibliography. Appendix B is the interrogatory used to stimulate conversation and control the input of information.

The author then rated each divisional inspection against the dimensions of the systemic method established earlier in the chapter. The analysis incorporated the interviews and written material to answer the question "Is the inspection more systemic than compliance?" for each of the dimensions. The result was a divisional inspection profile based on the systemic method dimensions. Table 1 summarizes the results of the research by rating the degree to which each installation uses a systemic inspection. Study of the tabulated results of research into the IG inspections used at seven divisional installations in FORSCOM shows that divisional inspections are largely compliance. In only one instance does this dimensional analysis of the divisional inspections yield a methodology more systemic than compliance in nature.

Although the difficulty of truly defining an inspection as either compliance or systemic is staggering, this analysis clearly shows that the guidance provided in AR 20-1 is not followed to any consistent degree. An analysis of the Table 1 results and of the discussions with the inspectors general at those installations yields the following explanations for the apparent breakdown:

1. Primarily the inspection methodology at each installation represents a product defined by the commanding general of that division. In the absence of clear, usable instruction, the commanding general establishes an inspection that reflects his command philosophy or management technique. Because the commanding general normally serves a twenty-four month tour, reassessment of the inspection is frequent. The inspection method often changes as a new division commander assumes duties.

2. The transition from regulatory guidance to methodology at the division level is difficult. Although the techniques espoused by DAIG have a clear application at that level or at a MACOM level, they simply

INSPECTION
CHARACTERISTICS

	ISSUES	TEAM SIZE	ROOT CAUSE	FEEDBACK	CAPABILITY	FREQUENCY	FLCM
D	1	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
I	2	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
N	3	No	No	No	No	No	No
S	4	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
V	5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
T	6	No	No	No	No	No	No
I	7	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
A							
S							
L							
I							
L							
O							
A							
N							
T							
A							
I							
L							
O							

Table 1. Is the inspection more systemic than compliance?

do not fit at the division. The analysis from Table 1 shows this. The Functional Life Cycle Model is the heart of the inspection methodology advocated by AR 20-1 and the DAIG literature. No divisional installation, however, acknowledged use of the Functional Life Cycle Model as a way of insuring a systemic approach. Also, no division had developed an inspection that sought to assess capability of the unit. In all cases, the inspection aimed at defining the status of the inspected unit. Finally, the analysis shows that only two of the seven divisional inspections had devised a method of inspecting that focused on researched issues. In the other cases, the inspection began with a general search for compliance. At the divisional installation, the application of the systemic methodology is often unclear and may run counter to the objectives of the division commander.

SUMMARY

Although AR 20-1 and other literature published by DAIG provide guidance on the conduct of IG inspections, the application of this guidance is difficult at the divisional installation level. The regulation, in fact, specifically allows each installation to develop its own system for inspections while encouraging a systemic approach. The definition of a systemic inspection involves a complex comparison of elements with the traditional compliance approach. This study rated the IG inspections of divisional installations in FORSCOM against seven characteristics common to a systemic approach. The results indicated that only one inspection was more systemic oriented than compliance oriented. The trends demonstrated by the divisional installation inspections show that, while the philosophy of the systemic inspection has been implemented, the techniques are not generally used. This is due not only to the difficulty of application at the division but also to the conflict with the desires of the various commanding generals.

Chapter Four

PROBLEMS IN THE INSPECTION SYSTEM

Chapters Two and Three have focused on trends observable in the U.S. Army Inspector General inspection process. Agencies external to the Department of Defense, principally Congress, began to take an interest in the IG process during the 1970s and into the early 1980s. This interest was aimed at improvement of executive agency efficiency and not at modification of the traditional military IG role. Congressional interest, however, impinged on the military IG system and created a new interest in fraud, waste, and abuse, rather than in the condition of the troops. The Army's IG inspection system changed. Chapter Three dealt with details of the new inspection system and the application to the divisional installation IG inspection process. This chapter will enumerate factors that are indicative of a problem in the Army's IG inspection approach. These factors are found at the divisional installation level; however, often the entire IG system from the Department of the Army down to division level feels the effect.

There are both positive and negative outcomes resulting from the changes directed in the inspection process. The positive outcome is the favorable reception of the philosophy underlying the systemic inspection approach. Since the research outlined in Chapter Three has demonstrated that most FORSCOM divisions have not implemented a systemic inspection, negative outcomes addressed in this paper represent gaps between the objectives of the systemic approach and potential results achieved by implementing such an inspection.

POSITIVE OUTCOMES

The most pervasive outcome of the new inspection approach is positive. Stated simply, the IG inspection is no longer threatening. The information gathered from the FORSCOM inspectors general concerning their inspections overwhelmingly indicated that the divisional IG inspections were not a test. Although inspected units could be graded, adverse actions resulting from poor unit performance were rare. Terms such as diagnostic, issue identification, and teaching exercise, which abounded in the description of the inspection approaches, are indicative of a much less threatening environment than that found in the old inspection method.

A review of the literature written on the new IG inspection approach points to the same philosophy. Col. William H. Hicks, the IG for the Communications Command, states, "Inspectors under the old system used to

be a pain in the butt" (6:44). He goes on to explain that the new approach involves a different role for the inspector. He has ". . . to educate the people to be smart enough to realize what the problem is and that the IG is here to help" (6:44). The Inspector General of III Corps describes the command's efforts to establish a systemic inspection approach as a team effort where there is ". . . an opportunity for commanders, leaders and soldiers to register a problem with the system" (11:39). The ". . . emphasis really was on trusting the commander, empowering leaders and doing what made sense" (11:38). Thus, the new inspection approach has created a more open environment that causes the IG inspection to be viewed with less apprehension. This philosophy is more conducive to good work by the inspected unit and the inspectors.

POTENTIAL NEGATIVE OUTCOMES

The research outlined in Chapter Three demonstrated that the divisions have not implemented a systemic inspection approach; however, as discussed above, the philosophy associated with the systemic approach has been universally embraced. Why has the methodology of the inspection failed to attract more converts among the divisional installation IGs and commanders? The answer to that question lies partly in the potentially negative outcomes anticipated by the divisions in applying the new methodology. This paper notes three potentially negative outcomes associated with a division implementing the systemic methodology and a fourth negative outcome, which exists as a result of the current regulatory guidance.

Although the systemic approach includes a compliance element, the focus of the inspection is on an issue. Typically, the inspector using the systemic approach begins at a company or battalion and moves rapidly to the next level, following the system that links the elements from the Functional Life Cycle Model. He spends little time at the company. The time he does spend is focused very narrowly on an issue. Yet the company and battalion are the basis of the entire Army. Most problems in the system ultimately impact on the company. As Col. Mike Malone, a renowned military journalist, eloquently points out, the company is "a miniature of the larger Army--smaller but parallel; the place where the spirit of the soldier lives; the focal point of combat readiness" (7:3); and, "a junction box, into which are plugged the terminal wires of a thousand policies and programs" (7:3). The systemic approach largely ignores the importance of the company in favor of an issue.

This dependence on an issue as the initiator of the inspection creates a second weakness in the systemic application to divisional installation inspections. At higher headquarters, a pre-inspection analysis determines the direction an inspection takes through selection of a number of issues. This pre-inspection analysis involves review of previous IG findings, audits from other inspection agencies, and known systemic failures. The inspection system depends on a review of investigative work that has already been accomplished and, to some extent, developed through earlier efforts. At the divisional level, however, the IG provides the only external inspection of a company or battalion. Since

there is a scarcity of available findings and reports, the divisional IG cannot focus his inspection on the verification or expansion of known weaknesses. He must find the issues. In many ways that is more desirable, since the company, as Colonel Malone indicates, is the terminus of all the actions on-going in the Army. The inspection in the company will find problems that have not yet been audited or reported. Thus, the systemic inspection, by narrowly directing its efforts to a previously defined issue, often fails to uncover potential problems within the company. These problems could impact on the entire Army.

A third potentially negative aspect of the systemic inspection application at the divisional installation involves the teaching function of the IG. AR 20-1 lists one role of the IG as teacher of the inspected organization (15:3-1). Lieutenant General Trefry further expounded on this role by saying that the "inspector general who inspects but does not teach how the Army runs. . . is not accomplishing his mission" (9:135). The teaching role is accepted by both the inspectors general and the rest of the Army.

The systemic approach, however, ignores the individual who is a key in the learning process--the commander. The systemic approach, with its narrow focus on a specific issue, allots little time to the company or battalion. As a result, the inspector spends a short training period with the commander, and that time often deals with a single program or policy for which the commander is responsible. An underlying tenet of the systemic approach is the replacement of the traditional IG compliance orientation by a similar inspection conducted by commanders. "Adoption of the. . . systemic inspection approach requires that commanders throughout the Army conduct continuous command and staff inspections of and by their organizations" (15:3-1).

Although the commander is responsible for inspecting his unit, even as he was before the systemic approach, now he is not afforded the learning experience provided by an IG inspection. General Bruce C. Clarke, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, observed that commanders live too close to the problems. "They go through their areas of responsibility without noticing things to correct. . . ." (1:28) Part of the IG's role as trainer should involve focusing on the inspection needs of the company and battalion commander by providing up-to-date information and experience. The IG has an organization dedicated to inspecting and maintaining current knowledge on policies and regulations. The systemic approach squeezes the time spent by the IG with the inspected commander and, therefore, stifles the ability of the IG to fulfill his role as a teacher in training the commander to complete his inspection responsibility.

Thus, because the systemic approach is associated with negative outcomes, it is not used at the divisional installation level. Not only is the commander left alone to conduct and train for his inspection, but also the lower levels of the Army are largely ignored, and many potential problems are overlooked by beginning the inspection with a known issue.

There is a fourth negative outcome associated with the current regulation governing the systemic approach to inspecting--standardization of the inspection throughout the Army. Although under the previous

compliance approach every divisional installation had a different inspection. Now there is a broader range of techniques available. Previously the divisional installation created an inspection that was compliance in nature. Now the inspection, as this study has demonstrated, can have a multitude of steps between a purely systemic approach and a totally compliance approach. Lack of standardization means that each time a soldier transfers from one divisional installation to another, he must learn a new system. It means that each time a new commanding general arrives, he feels obligated to put his mark on the inspection. Furthermore, it follows that the efficiency of the entire Army inspection system is questionable since the areas of interest fluctuate between installations. A standardized inspection for the divisional installation would prove beneficial to the soldier, who would understand what to expect from place to place, and more beneficial to the Army in systematically isolating problems.

SUMMARY

Although the change to a different inspection system has created positive attitudinal change in the inspectors as well as the soldiers receiving an inspection, there are potentially negative aspects of the new system. The systemic inspection approach largely ignores the company, which is the cornerstone of the Army organization. The omission of the company creates a gap in the problem identification efforts of the IG inspection system. Because most systemic failures in the Army ultimately affect the company, the systemic inspection overlooks many problems that could be located in those organizations. The systemic inspection begins with an issue that has been identified and attempts to expand upon it rather than identify new issues. For the divisional IG, there are few other agencies who could produce issues to be used in a systemic inspection. In addition, use of the systemic approach hampers the IG's ability to train the company and battalion commander to be a thorough inspector. A final negative aspect of the systemic inspection is the low degree of standardization throughout the Army.

Chapter Five

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL

The preceding chapter covered problems that evolve from the implementation of the systemic approach at the divisional installation. These problems explain, in part, the low application of systemic inspection techniques found in the survey of FORSCOM divisions. Additionally, the preceding chapter identified a lack of standardization as a negative aspect of the existing IG inspection system. This chapter will develop specific recommendations to correct the problems that have been noted and, in concluding, will suggest guidance to be issued by DAIG to divisional installations. The adoption of the ideas put forth in this chapter involve a change to AR 20-1, which is under the proponency of the Department of the Army IG.

RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

This paper presents three recommendations to improve the IG inspection system at the divisional installation level. These recommendations require specific changes to AR 20-1 and the associated literature that supports its application. Since, as noted in Chapter Three, the majority of the divisional installations are not following the guidance in AR 20-1, the recommendations bring the policy into focus with reality. The recommendations are as follows:

1. Make the divisional installation IG inspection support the systemic approach used by FORSCOM and DAIG. Currently the two systems are not linked. There is no effort to create a cohesive, logical system that incorporates all the available IG assets in an efficient manner. As a result, the division IG and his higher counterpart are subject to duplicative efforts with the resulting inefficiency. The division IG should be a source of issues for higher level IGs to consider during the preparation for a systemic inspection. Although to a small degree that is accomplished now in the form of findings, it is not systematic. The regulation does not require a periodic submission, and the procedure depends on the division for initiation.
2. Direct the divisional installation to conduct compliance inspections at battalion and company level. This is the first step in developing a cohesive IG inspection system that incorporates assets from the lowest to the highest level. A systemic inspection must depend on a compliance element for problem identification. Currently this is accomplished through a review of previous compliance inspections and audits. If the IG inspection process is viewed as one system beginning at the company and

battalion, then the company inspection should be compliance to identify the issues to be used in further systemic investigation. A compliance inspection further provides the opportunity to train commanders.

3. Reemphasize that the IG role involves soldiers. The IG, as the court of last appeal for the soldier, needs to be seen. His visibility in the company and battalion demonstrates his concern for the soldier, reasserts his interest in the soldier's environment, and validates his position as an honest broker between the commander and the soldier. A compliance inspection places the IG in a company or battalion with soldiers.

Implementation of these recommendations would produce an IG inspection that has the following steps:

1. The division IG conducts a compliance inspection of a battalion using the areas directed by regulation and those discretionary areas permitted by regulation.

2. The division IG tells the inspected unit in what areas they were deficient. Although follow-up is needed, this ends the compliance phase.

3. The division IG conducts an analysis of issues uncovered during the compliance inspection. Issues are developed and investigated for facts. Those issues solvable at the installation are worked by the divisional installation.

4. Those issues not solvable are periodically forwarded to a higher level. This data, along with input from other divisions and other inspection agencies, is included in the systemic inspection process conducted by a higher level IG.

5. Higher level IG inspection verifies the issue by checking at other installations for the root cause or possible solution.

6. After the appropriate agency has devised and implemented a solution to address the problem, the division IG who originated the issue submits a follow-up report assessing the degree to which the issue has been rectified.

INSPECTION MODEL FOR THE DIVISIONAL INSTALLATION

The purpose of this portion of the paper is to specify an inspection method which should be included as guidance from the DAIG. It demonstrates the detailed guidance that would standardize the inspection process while producing a coherent inspection throughout the Army. The regulation should provide such guidance as:

1. The inspection will be conducted at least every eighteen months.
2. The divisional installation IG will conduct a compliance

inspection of each battalion and separate company on the installation. The inspection duration will be three to five days.

3. The inspection will be conducted in two phases. The first phase will inspect for compliance with regulations, policies, and plans at the company and battalion level. The second phase will be performance oriented to more fully develop breakdowns in unit procedures that were observed in the first phase.

4. The compliance phase of the inspection will include the following areas:

- Personnel inspection
- Barracks inspection
- Battalion (separate company) administration
- Company training management
- Company supply procedures
- NBC equipment status
- Weapons status
- Vehicular status
- Repair parts procedures

Other areas may be inspected at the discretion of the division.

5. Performance activities should be designed to verify or expand compliance findings. A vehicular roll-out of assigned equipment and soldier skills tests will be included in the inspection.

IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of the inspection procedure that is outlined above involves only a minor modification of a regulation, but a major marketing program with at least two diverse agencies. The first agency whose interests must be considered is the commanding general. This individual has enjoyed a great degree of freedom in deciding the nature and scope of the inspection in his division. The Army permits this because it is considered appropriate to provide a commander with as much discretionary freedom of action as possible. The General Accounting Office (GAO), in reporting to Congress on the Army IG system, states that the Department of the Army Inspector General ". . . does not have direct control over the approximately 1,280 lower level inspector general personnel. . . ." (12:ii) The report went on to say that ". . . their commanders do not have to agree to change their inspection approach" (12:ii). The GAO concluded in this report that a change is possible at the divisional installation. "The Inspector General (DA) could change the inspection approach at the lower levels if he develops specific guidance and insures that the guidance is implemented by direction of the Secretary of the Army" (12:ii). A change directed by the highest levels of the Army would be palatable to the division commander because the inspection, in most cases, would be a refinement of the compliance method already in use.

As noted in Chapter Two of this paper, the influence of Congress on the military IG has grown. In the same GAO report cited previously, the Comptroller General recommended that the divisional installation inspections assume a more systemic nature. Although this would seem to argue against the recommendations of this paper, on analysis it does not. The major problems noted by GAO were the duplication of inspection effort and the lack of direction of the lower level inspection (12:iii). Both of these problems are addressed by the system espoused in this report. The advantages offered by an inspection system that actively involves all inspectors general are twofold. First, it would eliminate the duplicative effort between levels of inspectors. Second, the proposed methodology would focus the effort of all inspectors general toward one end.

CONCLUSION

As a means of inspecting in the Army, the IG systemic approach does not fulfill its potential. It represents a management idea that emphasizes the isolation of fraud, waste, and abuse, which have become the watchwords in the halls of Congress. A military IG, however, cannot concern himself solely with management; the welfare and condition of the soldier must remain his central interest. Therefore, the Army inspection system should be designed to determine both the managerial problems associated with fraud, waste, and abuse and the leadership problems associated with the soldier. For an inspection to properly evaluate the soldier-areas, it must look in detail at the organization where the soldier works and lives--the company and battalion. That is why the divisional installations in FORSCOM demonstrate a strong preference for an inspection that evaluates the company and battalion in detail through a compliance methodology. There is a proper level for both the compliance and systemic approaches. The recognition that a divisional inspection can generate, through compliance technique, useful systemic issues for resolution by higher level IGs is key to producing a more efficient and effective Army IG inspection system.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH IN STEPS

1. Learn as much about the general system to be inspected as possible. Sources include published documents, available schools, and knowledgeable individuals.
2. Identify the personnel who operate in or affect the system. Understand their relationships and responsibilities.
3. Identify the process or processes that cause the system to function.
4. Determine the problems that exist within that system by conducting an analysis of available reports such as General Accounting Office reports, Army Audit Agency reports, and Criminal Investigation Division reports. Organize this information into categories from the Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army. Search for the relationships between problems in each category.
5. Develop an inspection plan that includes a statement of the key problems. Determine time available, inspectors available, training requirements, initial inspection sites, and continuing inspection sites.
6. Select the key issues. Hypothesize possible causes for the problems in terms of the Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army.
7. Conduct the inspection.
8. Portray the inspection results to the appropriate responsible individuals.
9. Conduct a follow-up inspection to insure the solution arrived at by the responsible individual works.

Appendix B

TELEPHONIC SURVEY INSTRUMENT

The following questions were asked of all respondents:

1. Does your divisional installation conduct a general inspection of the battalion and company? If so, how often are they conducted?
2. Does the inspection you conduct focus on issues? If so, how do you develop the issues?
3. Could you briefly describe the inspection format?
4. How many inspectors do you use in conducting the inspection?
5. In your opinion, how does the commanding general view the IG inspection process; i.e., is it a diagnostic or a test?
6. How are the results of your inspection handled? Is the unit briefed? Are they required to submit a reply of the actions taken on the noted deficiencies?
7. After the inspection is completed, what happens to the information that was gathered? Is there any attempt to trace the problem beyond the inspected unit? Are findings routinely forwarded to higher headquarters?
8. Would you categorize the inspection conducted at your installation as compliance or systemic in nature? Why?

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